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Abstract Credit card fraud detection is a very chal-
lenging problem because of the specific nature of trans-
action data and the labeling process. The transaction
data is peculiar because they are obtained in a stream-
ing fashion, they are strongly imbalanced and prone to
non-stationarity. The labeling is the outcome of an ac-
tive learning process, as every day human investigators
contact only a small number of cardholders (associated
to the riskiest transactions) and obtain the class (fraud
or genuine) of the related transactions. An adequate se-
lection of the set of cardholders is therefore crucial for
an efficient fraud detection process.
In this paper, we present a number of active learn-
ing strategies and we investigate their fraud detection
accuracies. We compare different criteria (supervised,
semi-supervised and unsupervised) to query unlabeled
transactions. Finally, we highlight the existence of an
exploitation/exploration trade-off for active learning in
the context of fraud detection, which has so far been
overlooked in the literature. 1
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1 Introduction
The use of machine learning for credit card fraud detec-
tion requires to address a number of challenges. Some of
them are related to the data distribution, notably the
class imbalance of the training set (many more genuine
transactions than fraudulent ones), the non-stationarity
of the phenomenon (due to changes in the behavior of
customers as well as in fraudsters), the large dimension-
ality and the overlapping classes (while fraudsters try
to emulate cardholders behavior, genuine behaviors of
cardholders might look strange or anomalous).
The labeling process is constrained, as every day human
investigators may contact only a small number of card-
holders associated with the riskiest transactions and ob-
tain the class (fraud or genuine) of the related transac-
tions. The high cost of human labour, for assessing the
transaction labels, leads to the labeling bottleneck [2].
In this context, an automatic Fraud Detection System
(FDS) should support the activity of the investigators
by letting them focus on the transactions with the high-
est fraud probability. From the perspective of the trans-
actional service company, this is crucial in order to re-
duce the costs of the investigation activity and to retain
the customer confidence. From a machine learning per-
spective it is important to keep an adequate balance
between exploitation and exploration, i.e. between the
short-term needs of providing good alerts to investi-
gators, and the long-term goal of maintaining a high
accuracy of the system (e.g. in the presence of concept
drift).
The issue of labeling the most informative data by mini-
mizing the cost has been extensively addressed by active
learning which can be considered as a specific instance
of semi-supervised learning [8,41], the domain studying
how unlabeled and labeled data can both contribute to
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a better learning process. The Active Learning (AL)
literature have proposed a number of techniques to se-
lect, within a large set of unlabeled instances, the most
informative to label. AL can be typically described by
the iteration of three steps [41]:
1. Selection: given a query budget of size k, a model
is used to choose which k data points, once labeled,
could better describe the data generating process;
2. Querying : selected points are submitted to an oracle
(in our case an investigator) for labeling;
3. Training : the labeled data points are used to train
and update the model;
The Selection and Querying steps differentiate active
learning from conventional (passive) learning, which is
limited to the Training step. Note also that, in order to
bootstrap the procedure, a random initialization or an
unsupervised model is used [41].
A first classification of AL methods can be done ac-
cording to the model used for the Selection step. In this
paper, we will distinguish between methods using only
supervised information and methods integrating other
sources of information, notably unsupervised or semi-
supervised. Additionally, according to the nature of the
dataset, we can distinguish between two main AL ap-
proaches: pool-based and streaming AL. In pool-based
AL, the algorithm performs queries in the same set of
unlabeled points, while in stream-based AL, the set of
unlabeled data points is periodically updated. The ac-
curacy of a pool-based AL classifier is expected to grow
in time, since more and more labeled data points, from
the original dataset, are used for the Training. This is
not always true in the case of the streaming approach,
since data received in different periods may differ sig-
nificantly (e.g. concept drift).
Though AL is widely addressed in the literature [11,25],
few articles mention the aspects of credit card fraud de-
tection (Section 2.2), notably the class imbalance [17,
56] (in our case study approximately only 0.2% of trans-
actions2 are fraudulent), the restricted labeling budget
[37,49] and the specific nature of the assessment [42]. It
is worth to remark that in credit card fraud detection,
though the observations are at the level of transactions,
the ultimate goal is to detect fraudulent cards. There
exists a one-to-many relation between cards and trans-
actions.
A peculiarity of fraud detection is that the labeling
and the assessment phase are coincident and conse-
quently strongly dependent. For the transactional ser-
2 Though some papers on fraud detection present datasets
with still lower rates (0.01% in [15], 0.005% in [2], 0.02%
in [51] and 0.004% in [36]) our dataset is inline with other
recent works on fraud detection ([47],[22] and [39] have a class
imbalance rate of 0.8%, 0.5% and 0.4% respectively).
vice provider it is important that the investigations are
as successful as possible (i.e. low false positive rate).
This means that the accuracy of a FDS is measured in
terms of precision over the top k alerted credit cards [5,
33]. This is not always the case in other AL tasks where
the labels of the k queried points are not directly re-
lated to the accuracy of the training process. In a FDS,
it is not only important to minimize the labeling cost
but also that this labeling allows to discover as many
frauds as possible. The nature and the intensity of the
exploration step has a strong impact on the final ac-
curacy of detection and, accordingly, the set of state-
of-the-art AL strategies which are effective in practice
is much more limited than expected. In other terms
no real-life FDS can afford a totally random labeling
process since this would necessarily imply an unaccept-
able short-term random performance. This exploita-
tion/exploration trade-off inherent to fraud detection,
to the best of our knowledge, has not been addressed
in the research literature.
The contributions of this article are: i) a taxonomy of
streaming AL strategies (and a number of their vari-
ants) for credit card fraud detection, ii) an extensive
comparison of these techniques for the detection of both
fraudulent transactions and cards, iii) an experimen-
tal assessment on the basis of a massive set of 12 mil-
lion transactions in terms of real-life criteria (defined
by our industrial partner, Worldline, a leader company
in transactional services) and iv) a two-dimensional vi-
sualisation of the effects of active learning on the dis-
tribution of the training set. The outcome is an original
analysis of the exploitation/exploration trade-off in the
context of a real-world FDS. In particular, we expect
that visualization represents a valuable insight on the
evolution of the training set during active learning. In
fact, though the rationale of active learning is explicit,
it is not always evident to understand how active learn-
ing modifies the distribution of the training set, notably
in a task, like credit card fraud detection, characterized
by large noise, nonlinearity and non separability. Also,
we expect that potential bias of AL sampling strategies
are easier to assess in a visual setting.
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
related state-of-the-art. Section 3 provides the general
outline of our Fraud Detection System. Section 4 in-
troduces the visualization technique used throughout
the manuscript. Section 5 discusses a number of AL
strategies (as well as possible variants) for dealing with
streaming credit card transactions. Finally, Section 6
presents an extensive experimental session based on a
real stream of transactions.
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2 Related work
In this section, we will present some important state-of-
the-art works in fraud-detection. The review of conven-
tional passive learning for fraud detection is presented
in the Section 2.1, while active learning techniques and
their application to fraud detection are introduced in
Section 2.2.
2.1 Passive learning for fraud detection
Credit card fraud detection belongs to the largest do-
main of outlier detection [1,7,32] also called anomaly
or novelty detection. The main approaches to anomaly
detection are:
1. Classification based: these supervised techniques
make the assumption that a classifier of anoma-
lies can be learnt from a training set and that
the test set distribution is not significantly differ-
ent from the training one. Several supervised ma-
chine learning algorithms have been discussed in
literature [40,43,53]. In most cases an optimal de-
tection can be obtained by combining multiple su-
pervised machine learning techniques. For instance,
Wei et al. [51] introduce ContrastMiner, a fraud de-
tection framework which combine the use of contrast
pattern mining, neural network and decision forest
to have a high precision in the detection. In our
previous research we have used and assessed sev-
eral binary classifiers for fraud detection [33,13].
Also one-class classifiers, like one-class SVM and
Isolation Forest, belong to this category. One-class
SVM [38] fits a boundary around the known set of
normal points, and then classifies as outlier every-
thing which stands over the boundary. The Isolation
Forest [27] uses the length of the path between the
root and the leaves in the trees of a Random forest
as outlier score.
2. Nearest neighbor based: the rationale is that the
distribution of the neighbors (or local density) of a
point characterizes the genuine or anormal nature
of a point. In particular, normal instances stand
in dense areas while outliers are located far from
dense areas. Local Outlier Factor (LOF) is a well-
known density/neighbour based technique proposed
by Breunig et al. in [4]. Variants of LOF have been
proposed in [23,34,46,54].
3. Clustering based: once the training set is properly
clustered, outliers are expected to be located much
farther away from the clusters center than normal
ones.
4. Statistically based: they require the estimation of
the multivariate distribution of data and return a
score of outlierness which is inversely proportional
to the density of a point. Gaussian Mixture Mod-
els (GMM) [16,19,26,55] are commonly used in this
context because of their flexible semi-parametric na-
ture. Hidden Markov Models have been used in [45]
for credit card outlier detection. Bolton et al. [3]
presented two statistical approaches which rely on
monitoring the anomalous behavior of a cardholder
compared to a group of peers (peer group analysis)
or to cardholder behavior (break point analysis).
5. Information theoretic: they rely on the fact that
anomalies create irregularities in the dataset and
can be detected with information theoretic mea-
sures.
6. Spectral anomaly detection: these techniques trans-
form the original dataset in a way that facilitate
the separation of normal instances and outliers.
A commonly used transformation technique is the
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [12,28,50].
Shuy et al. [44] proposed to combine the effect of
the major component and the minor component.
While the major component is used to find extreme
values, the minor component highlights those obser-
vations which do not conform to the normal corre-
lation structure.
7. Outlier detection combined with feature selection:
unsupervised outlier detection has been recently
combined with feature selection. Pang et al. pro-
posed a filter-based feature selection framework for
unsupervised outlier selection [29]. This approach
improved the outlier detection rates while sub-
stantially reducing the number of features by 46%
(on average). The same authors proposed a novel
wrapper-based outlier detection framework [30] to
iteratively optimize the feature subset selection and
the outlier score. The results showed that the frame-
work improved not only the AUC-ROC, but also the
precision over the top-n ranked instances.
2.2 Active learning
Unlike passive learning, active learning modifies the size
and nature of the training set by choosing from a un-
labeled set a subset of points whose label is expected
to improve the classifier. The AL setting is particularly
promising in fraud detection because of the cost and
the delay related to the labeling of instances. How-
ever, the adaptation of active learning to the specific
characteristics of fraud detection data has only been
partially addressed in the research literature. Fan et
al. [18] carried out an empirical analysis on a fraud
detection dataset to assess AL approach in presence
of concept drift. They have focused on the adaptation
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ability of the AL strategy, but did not address the de-
tection accuracy. Pichara et al. [31] tested a large scale
anomaly detection approach in a synthetic dataset em-
ulating the fraud process. Their AL schema has been
able to detect the whole subset of frauds using a number
of queries smaller than a Bayesian Network detection
approach. Multiple tests were repeated using different
data-noise levels, and their AL approach consistently
outperformed the other techniques.
However, the use a synthetic dataset reduces the im-
pact of these results. It is very difficult to create a re-
liable and synthetic credit card dataset, since transac-
tions (frauds and genuine) are very diverse and evolve
in an unpredictable way. Van Vlasselaer et al. [48]
applied active inference, a network-based algorithm,
to fraud discovery in social security real data. They
found that committee-based strategies, based on un-
certainty, result in a slightly better classification per-
formance than expert-based strategies. Nevertheless,
expert-based strategies are often preferred in order to
obtain unbiased training sets from queries.
The relationship between active learning and stream-
ing data, notably the sampling bias issue, is discussed
in [14]. The authors showed that in stream-based ac-
tive learning, the estimated input-output dependency
changes over time and depends on the instances pre-
viously queried. Since those instances are typically se-
lected next to the class decision boundary of the clas-
sifier, this may lead to a biased representation of the
underlying data distribution. AL and concept drift is
also addressed in [57]. Here, the authors stressed how
concept drift may be missed in regions far from where
AL queries normally take place (e.g. boundary regions
between classes). The authors showed that techniques
based on classical uncertainty sampling favor close con-
cept drift adaptation while techniques based on random
sampling are more effective in dealing with remote con-
cept drift. The best performing techniques can strongly
depend on the characteristics of the data and the size
of the query budget.
The issue of sampling bias is specifically discussed in
[20]. Jacobusse and Veenman present multiple solu-
tions to tackle the sampling bias on highly imbalanced
datasets and screening applications. In such conditions,
a small group of targets need to be detected among the
non-targets vast majority. A random selection would
lead to a very poor detection. So, usually an expert
knowledge driven selection is preferred (medical screen-
ing application, law enforcement, screening of job ap-
plicants, ...). The authors emphasize that this selection
is prone to suffer of a strong bias towards the previ-
ous knowledge of the expert, causing the classifier to
be trained on a non representative dataset. A similar
problem is faced in fraud detection, since only a small
subset of transactions can be labeled in the short term
and the selection of this subset corresponds to the riski-
est credit card transactions.
The integration of AL and semi-supervised learning is
discussed in Xie and Xiong [52]. They introduced a
Stochastic Semi-Supervised Learning (SSSL) process to
infer labels in case of large imbalanced datasets with
small proportion of labeled points. The approach relies
on the consideration that since the number of unla-
beled points is huge and the minority class is rare, the
probability of making a wrong majority assignment is
very low. Consequently, they proposed the assignment
of the majority class to random selection of points and
adopted it with success in the context of a data com-
petition.
Finally, an original approach that may be used to deal
with the one-to-many relationships between cards and
transactions is discussed in [42]. They present an AL ap-
proach for multiple-instance problems where instances
are organized into bags. Typical examples of multiple-
instance problems are found in text classification and
content-based image retrieval. In these type of prob-
lems a bag is said to be positive if it includes at least
one instance which is positive, while the bag is negative
if no positive instances are observed in it.
3 The fraud detection system classifier
Let us consider a Fraud Detection System (FDS) whose
goal is to detect automatically frauds in a stream of
transactions. Let x ∈ Rn be the vector coding the
transaction (e.g. including features like the transac-
tion amount, the terminal) and y ∈ {+,−} the asso-
ciated label, where + denotes a fraud and − a genuine
transaction. A detection strategy needs a measure of
risk (score) associated to any transaction. In a machine
learning approach this score is typically provided by
the estimation of the a posteriori probability PC(+|x)
returned by a classifier C. We consider a streaming set-
ting where unlabeled transactions arrive one at a time
or in small batches.
The FDS goal is to raise every day a fixed and small
number of k alerts. In our industrial case study, n =
32 and k is set to 100 on the basis of cost and work
organization considerations.
The issuing of those alerts has two consequences: the
trigger of an investigation and the consequent labeling
of the associated transactions. The outcome of the in-
vestigation determines both the success rate of the FDS
and the new set of labeled transactions.
We will present in section 6 two levels of experimental
validations: the first concerns the detection of fraud-
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ulent transactions, while the second focuses on fraud-
ulent cards. In the first experiment, the classifier C is
implemented by a conventional Random Forest, while
in the second, we use a more complex approach (en-
semble of classifiers) dictated by the more challenging
nature of the detection tasks. This approach has been
presented in [5,33] and consists of the weighted average
of two classifiers
PC(+|x) = wAPDt(+|x) + (1− wA)PFt(+|x) (1)
where Dt and Ft stand for Delayed classifier and Feed-
back classifier respectively and wA ∈ [0, 1] is the weight
controlling the contribution of the two classifiers. Dt is
implemented as an ensemble of Balanced Random Trees
[10,35] trained on old transactions for which we can rea-
sonably consider the class as known. Ft is trained on
recently alerted transactions, for which a Feedback was
returned by investigators. It is therefore alimented by
the active learning component of the fraud detection
system. This Feedback component is very important to
address concept drift.
This architecture is the result of an extensive model
selection and assessment procedure which has been dis-
cussed in our previous work [5,33]. The aim of this pa-
per is to discuss the impact of different AL strategies, so
we will not take into consideration alternative classifier
architectures.
4 Dataset visualization
Credit Card Fraud Detection deals with high-volume
(millions of transactions) and large dimensionality (n =
32 in our example) datasets. So, it is difficult to have
a visual insight of the data distribution and the nature
(e.g. non-separability) of the classification task. As a
consequence most papers rely only on predictive accu-
racy (e.g. ROC curves) to assess the difficulty of the
task. Given the dynamic and sampling nature of AL ,
it is however relevant to visualize the location of the
selected query points with respect to the original data
distribution in order to better illustrate the differences
between alternative strategies. In the following section
we will complement the presentation of the different
AL strategies with a visual representation of our exper-
imental dataset (details are in Section 6) in the space
of the two first Principal Components (denoted by PC1
and PC2). Fig. 1 shows the Class Conditional distribu-
tions of the two classes (Fraud in red and Genuine in
blue) in the PC1/PC2 space.
This visualization provides interesting insights about
the distribution of Frauds and Genuine transactions: i)
the two classes appear to be only partially overlapping
in the space, ii) the density of the fraudulent set appears
to have a higher variance than the genuine set and iii)
as far as the first principal component is concerned,
frauds have a distribution skewed to the left.
However, the class-conditional nature plot should not
mislead us to the conclusion that the problem is easy
to solve. In fact, given the high imbalance of the classes,
a large number of genuine transactions still occur in the
left part of the plot (mostly red).
In Section 5 we will use Fig. 1 as a template for il-
lustrating the distribution of the queries issued by the
different AL strategies taken into consideration.
Algorithm 1 Active Learning process
Require: k . total number of alerts
Require: q . exploration budget
Require: m . SSSL budget
Require: D . initial training set
1: for any new day do
2: C ← learning(D)
3: inTrx← unlabeled set
4: scores← {PC(x), x ∈ inTrx}
5: sel ← selection of the k − q points with highest risk
scores . HRQ
6: if (q > 0) then . EAL
7: Esel← q explorative points
8: sel← {sel, Esel}
9: end if
10: queries← investigator labeling of sel
11: if (m > 0) then . SSSL
12: SSSLset← m points based on a SSSL criterion
13: SSSLset← set label y(SSSLset) = 0
14: queries← {queries, SSSLset}
15: end if
16: D ← {D, queries}
17: end for
5 Active learning strategies
The rationale of AL is to select (on the basis of current
information) unlabeled training samples which, once la-
beled, can improve the accuracy. However, there are
two main unknowns concerning the effectiveness of AL
in credit card fraud detection. The first concerns the
strong imbalance of the class distribution: as the selec-
tion of adequate queries is the most important step of
an AL procedure. This step should take into account
that in such a large imbalanced problem, selecting ma-
jority class points will inevitably have a negligible im-
pact on accuracy. The second concerns the definition of
accuracy: measures of detection accuracy are strictly re-
lated to the capacity of discovering frauds, i.e. querying
minority class samples. This means that an AL strat-
egy for fraud detection requires some specific tuning for
being successful.
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Table 1: Summary of active learning and semi-supervised strategies described in the paper
Id Strategy Type
HRQ Highest Risk Querying Baseline / BL (Section 5.1)
R Random Querying
P Unsupervised (PCA) Querying
U Uncertainty Querying
M Mix of Random and Uncertainty Querying
Exploratory Active Learning /
EAL (Section 5.2)
SR SSSL on Random points
SU SSSL on Uncertain points
SM SSSL on Random/Uncertain points
SE SSSL on points most likely to be genuine
Stochastic Semi-Supervised Learning /
SSSL (Section 5.3)
SR-U SSSL on Uncertain points + Random Sampling
SR-R SSSL on Random points + Random Sampling
SR-M SSSL on Random/Uncertain points + Random Sampling
SSSL + EAL (Section 5.3)
SRN[p] SR with reduced x% of Negative Feedback Modified SSSL (Sections 5.3)
ROS Random Oversample
SMOTE SMOTE
Oversample (Section 5.4)
QFU Querying by Frequent Uncertainty
MF-... Max combining function
SM-... Softmax combining function
LF-... Logarithmic combining function
Multiple Instance Learning (Sections 5.5)
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Fig. 1: Class conditional distributions (level curves of
Frauds in red and of Genuine in blue) of transactions
in the PC1/PC2 space. The dataset of transactions is
collected on 15 consecutive days.
To illustrate the impact of AL on FDS, we will start
by considering a baseline strategy which simply queries
the highest risk transactions on the basis of the cur-
rent classification model. This strategy will be denoted
as the Highest Risk Querying (HRQ). Thereafter, we
will introduce and assess a number of modifications of
HRQ according to several principles. In order to make
the comparison easier we will define each AL strategy
as an instance of a generic AL strategy detailed in Al-
gorithm 1. The Algorithm requires the specification of
three parameters: the budget k of queries (i.e. maxi-
mum number of transactions that can be investigated
per day), the number of q queries defined for exploration
purposes and the number m of unlabeled transactions
that can be set as genuine without investigation (see
5.3). When q > 0, the choice of the queries demands
a selection criterion which plays a major role in the
final accuracy of AL. Note that the criteria used by
the methods discussed in the following sections can be
regrouped in three classes: supervised (i.e. relying on
labeled data), unsupervised and semi-supervised. The
entire list of discussed AL strategies is presented in Ta-
ble 1.
5.1 Highest risk querying
The idea of Highest Risk Querying (HRQ) is simple:
given a classifier C and a budget of queries, HRQ returns
the unlabeled transactions with the highest estimated
a posteriori probability PC(+|xi). HRQ is the most in-
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tuitive active learning strategy for our problem if we
consider that the final FDS accuracy depends on the
amount of minority class querying. Note that in terms
of the pseudocode in Algorithm 1, HRQ is obtained by
setting q = 0 and m = 0.
HRQ is expected to have a positive impact on accuracy
by discovering new instances from the minority class
and improving consequently the balance of the training
set. It has also some drawbacks: since its querying strat-
egy relies on the classifier accuracy, this selection step
could be inaccurate especially at the very beginning.
Fig. 2 represents a set of 200 query points returned by
HRQ. As expected, the classifier C selects points located
in areas where the class conditional density of frauds is
high (red areas). The training of a new classifier using
exclusively this subset of points may suffer of selection
bias, since the sample is not representative of the dis-
tribution of the genuine class.
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Fig. 2: Class conditional distributions in the PC1/PC2
space and the set of 200 transactions queried by the
HRQ approach.
5.2 Exploratory active learning
Exploratory Active Learning (EAL) strategies modify
HRQ by trading exploitation for exploration. The idea
is to convert a subset of the labeling budget in explo-
rative queries. The size of the exploration budget is rep-
resented by 0 < q ≤ k in Algorithm 1.
We may consider a number of exploration techniques for
selecting the q exploratory transactions. The simplest
one is random querying (denoted by EAL-R) which con-
sists in choosing randomly the q query points. This se-
lection is unsupervised and sub-optimal since it may
query points for which the classifier is already highly
confident about the class. A less naive unsupervised
strategy (denoted by EAL-P) consists in using an un-
supervised algorithm (e.g. PCA) to select the q queries.
An alternative with a supervised selection criterion is
represented by uncertainty querying (EAL-U) which re-
turns unlabeled data points for which the current clas-
sifier has low confidence [24]. The selection criterion is
therefore supervised: given a binary classifier C, the un-
certainty querying strategy gives priority to the trans-
actions xi for which PC(+|xi) ≈ 0.5. This value may
be affected by class imbalance and an higher threshold
may be chosen in the fraud detection setting. Neverthe-
less, it is a good practice to balance the dataset before
training the classifier. In the experimental section, we
will implicitly refer to a classifier C which is trained on
a balanced dataset.
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Fig. 3: Class conditional distributions in the PC1/PC2
space and the set of 200 transactions queried by the
Uncertainty Sampling approach.
Fig. 3 presents the visualization of a set of 200 transac-
tions selected by the Uncertainty Sampling approach.
The transactions are expected to be selected in areas
where the classifier C is the most uncertain. As a con-
sequence, selected transactions will lie in areas which
present a high density for both classes.
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Zˇliobaite˙ et al. [57] proposed the mix of the two tech-
niques, uncertainty querying and randomization, to
tackle remote concept drift (Section 2). The technique
(denoted by EAL-M) consists in querying by uncer-
tainty most of the points and in querying random points
from time to time.
5.3 Stochastic semi-supervised learning
The Stochastic Semi-Supervised Learning (SSSL) strat-
egy has been introduced by Xie and Xiong [52] to in-
fer labels in case of highly imbalanced datasets with a
large number of unlabeled points. The strategy relies
on a simple consideration: since the ratio between the
number of frauds and the total number of transactions
is very small, the probability of randomly selecting a
fraud is very low.
The resulting AL learning schema is made of four steps:
1. Selection: the current model is used to annotate all
unlabeled transactions with an estimated risk;
2. Querying : the highest risk transactions are labeled
by the investigators;
3. Majority assumption: a number of transactions are
labeled as genuine by majority assumption; in this
paper we explore a number of criteria to attribute
the majority class: pure random attribution (SR),
uncertainty (SU), mix of randomness and uncer-
tainty (SM) and low predicted risk (SE).
4. Training : the labeled data points, obtained by the
previous steps, are used to train/update a super-
vised model.
Though the selection strategy is supervised as in EAL,
SSSL differs in terms of the usage of the current model
C: the predicted risk is not only used to alert and trigger
the investigation but also to label (without investiga-
tion) a number of low risk transactions.
In order to illustrate the reliability of the majority as-
sumption, we report in Fig. 4 the distribution of the
scores PC(+|xi) over 15 days. In particular the his-
tograms (a), (b) and (c) refer to the score distribu-
tion for all transactions, genuine and fraudulent trans-
actions, respectively. The plot (d) represents the pro-
portion of fraudulent and genuine transactions for a
given score in the range [0, 1]. Note that, though the a
priori proportion of fraudulent cards in the dataset is
0.13%, it becomes 23.33% for scores higher than 0.95
and 61.90% for scores beyond 0.99. Note also that, in
the area of maximal uncertainty for C (e.g between 0.49
and 0.51), we find only 0.35% of frauds.
On the basis of those considerations, it is possible to
define a number of Stochastic Semi-Supervised strate-
gies:
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Fig. 4: Distribution of the scores obtained by PAt(+|xi)
in a range of 15 days involving 2.4 millions of cards for:
all the transactions (a), only genuine transactions (b)
and only fraudulent transactions (c). In (d), the propor-
tion of genuine and fraudulent transactions is plotted
while changing the score obtained by PAt(+|xi).
– SR: no exploration budget (q = 0) and attribution
of the majority class to m > 0 random transactions;
– SU: no exploration budget (q = 0) and attribution
of the majority class to the m > 0 most uncertain
points;
– SM: no exploration budget (q = 0) and attribution
of the majority class to the 0.7×m most uncertain
points and to 0.3×m random points;
– SE: no exploration budget (q = 0) and attribution
of the majority class to the m > 0 lowest risk points;
Additional variants can be created by simply allowing
an exploration budget (q > 0). The SR-U, SR-R and
SR-M strategies are hybrid strategies which combine
an exploration strategy (e.g. U in SR-U) and a SSSL
strategy (e.g. SR in SR-U).
Fig. 5 represents the set of 200 transactions selected
by an SR approach. The transactions are selected ran-
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Fig. 5: Class conditional distributions in PC1/PC2
space and the set of 200 transactions selected using the
Stochastic Semi-supervised Learning (SR) approach.
domly, and independently of the classifier C. It is im-
portant to note that this sampling strategy basically
follows the class conditional density of the Genuine
class. This is a consequence of the high imbalance of
the dataset, since the distribution of frauds is negligible
compared to the distribution of genuine transactions.
In [20], Jacobusse and Veenman presented additional
variants of the SSSL. They partition the original
dataset D under study in three subsets:
– D+: the subset of known positive samples, which
corresponds in our scenario to the subset of frauds
in the feedback set received by the investigators;
– D−: the subset of known negative samples, which
corresponds to the subset of genuine transactions in
the feedback set received by the investigators;
– D0: the subset of unlabeled samples, which corre-
sponds to the set of unlabeled transactions.
While SSSL proposes to add part of the samples in D0
and all the labeled samples in D+ and D−, the vari-
ant proposed by Jacobusse and Veenman suggests to
remove D− or part of it. The idea is to reduce the selec-
tion bias which can arise when the process of selection
is driven in an expert knowledge way. In our context
the expert knowledge selection is replaced by the clas-
sifier C. In the experimental section, we will refer to
this approach as SRN[p], with p being the percentage
of negative samples retained from the feedback set.
5.4 Oversampling
It is worth noting that a side-effect of the adoption
of SSSL (Section 5.3) is to add a number of majority
class samples to the training set. This goal is typically
achieved by oversampling techniques, with the main dif-
ference that here the target class is the majority class
and not the minority one. In order to assess how SSSL
situates with respect to conventional oversampling, we
also consider a comparison with the two main over-
sampling techniques: Random Oversample (ROS)[21]
and SMOTE [9]. ROS consists in duplicating some ran-
dom instances from the class to be oversampled until a
given sample size is reached. SMOTE creates artificial
instances from the target class in the following manner:
once the k nearest neighbors from the same class have
been identified, new artificial transactions are gener-
ated moving along the line segment joining the original
instance and its k neighbors.
5.5 Multiple instance learning
This section deals with another specificity of the credit
card fraud detection problem: the observations take
place at the level of transactions but what is relevant
for the company is the detection at the card level, since
the investigation is performed at the card level and not
at the transaction level.
From an AL perspective, since multiple transactions
map to the same card, we could select query points
by taking advantage of such one-to-many relationship.
5.5.1 Querying by frequent uncertainty
The rationale of Querying by Frequent Uncertainty
(QFU) boils down to query those cards which are
mapped to the largest number of uncertain transac-
tions. We associate to each card c a counter representing
how many of its associated transactions xi ∈ c are un-
certain, i.e. have a score PCt(+|xi) ∈ [0.5 − v, 0.5 + v]
where v determines the size of the uncertainty range.
The counters are updated in real-time and the AL se-
lection returns the k cards with the highest counters.
5.5.2 Combining function
A more advanced strategy to deal with card detection
is inspired by [42]. A combining function can be used to
aggregate all the posterior probabilities pci = PC(+|xi)
of the transactions xi ∈ c and derive the posterior prob-
ability PC(+|c).
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The simplest combining function is the max function
(denoted MF), which returns
PMFC (+|c) = max
xi∈c
pci (2)
Alternatively, authors in [42] propose the softmax com-
bining function:
PSMC (+|c) =
∑
xi
pcie
αpci∑
xi
eαp
c
i
(3)
where α is a constant that determines the extent to
which softmax approximates a max function.
In order to i) increase the sensitivity of the card risk
to high risk transactions and to ii) reduce its sensitiv-
ity to low risk transactions, we propose a logarithmic
combining function returning the score∑
xi∈c
− 1
log sci
(4)
where sci =
{
pci −  if pci > 0.5
 otherwise
and  is a very small
number.
Table 2: Scoring of transactions
Rank Card Id Trx Id pci
1 A A7 0.90
2 B B3 0.88
3 B B5 0.87
4 A A2 0.83
... ... ... ...
Table 3: Scoring of cards on the basis of transactions
from Table 2 with three combining functions
Card max(pci) softmax(p
c
i) log. (p
c
i)
A 0.90 0.87 34.21
B 0.88 0.88 34.55
... ... ... ...
Table 3 illustrates the scores associated to the transac-
tions of Table 2 for the three combining functions pre-
sented above. It appears that, unlike the max function,
the other two functions are able to take into account
the impact of multiple risky transactions on the overall
risk of a card. In other terms two high risk transactions
weight more than a simple one with a marginal higher
risk. However, the softmax and the logarithmic func-
tions differ in the importance they give to low risk trans-
actions. Suppose we add a low risk transaction (Table
4) for card “B” to the set of transactions of Table 2.
Table 5 shows that the sensitivity of the card risk to
such additional transaction is much larger in the soft-
max than in the logarithmic case. The counter-intuitive
consequence is that according to the softmax function
the card “B” becomes now less risky than the card “A”.
Table 4: Additional transaction
Rank Card Id Trx Id pci
20000 B B6 0.20
Table 5: Scoring of cards on the basis of transaction
from Tables 2 and 4 with three combining functions
Card max(pci) softmax(p
c
i) log. (p
c
i)
A 0.90 0.87 34.21
B 0.88 0.74 34.55
... ... ... ...
6 Experiments
This section relies on a large imbalanced dataset of 12
million credit card transactions provided by our indus-
trial partner Worldline.
In this realistic case-study, only a very small number
(k = 100) of cards per day can be queried, amount-
ing to roughly 0.2% of labeled points. The dataset has
32 features and it covers 60 days, each day including
roughly 200K transactions.
Two sets of experiments are performed: the first mea-
sures the detection accuracy at the level of the trans-
actions, while the second measures the detection accu-
racy at the card level. In the first study, for the sake of
simplicity, the classification model C is a conventional
random forest model RF while a more realistic model
A (discussed in [33] and in Section 3) is used for the
cards3. Since the randomization process in RF and A
may induce variability in the accuracy assessment, we
present the results of twenty repetitions of the stream-
ing.
All the AL strategies are compared in identical situ-
ations and initialized with the same random and bal-
anced set (initial training set D presented in algorithm
3 The use of two different learning strategies is justified by
the need to assess the robustness of the AL strategies with
respect to different learning methods and different detection
tasks (transaction-based and card-based).
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Fig. 6: Transaction-based case study with unsupervised passive learning. Box-plots summarize the accuracy mea-
sures obtained over 60 days and 20 trials. Black points indicate the mean value for each box. Comparison in
terms of: Top100 Precision (a), Area Under the Precision-Recall Curve (b) and Area Under the Receiver Operator
Characteristic Curve (c). Dark boxes indicate the best strategy (paired Wilcoxon test).
1). The results are presented as box-plots summariz-
ing the fraud detection performance over the 60 days.
In particular we have considered the following accuracy
measures: Top100 Precision, Area Under the Precision-
Recall Curve (AUC-PR) and Area Under the Receiver
Operator Characteristic Curve (AUC-ROC). In all the
plots, the dark boxes are used to denote the most accu-
rate AL strategy as well as the ones which do not differ
significantly from it (paired Wilcoxon signed rank test
with 5% significance level).
The precision over the Top100 alerts is expected to be
larger for RF than A since multiple positive alerts for
the same card will be accounted as several true positives
in the transaction case but as a single success in the card
case. We made all the code available on Github4.
6.1 Transaction-based fraud detection
In order to better situate the results of AL techniques,
we start by reporting the accuracy of several passive
(Section 2.1) unsupervised methods. In Fig. 6, we show
the accuracy of six state-of-the-art unsupervised out-
lier detection techniques: One-class Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM), Local Outlier Factor (LOF), Isolation
4 https://github.com/fabriziocarcillo/
StreamingActiveLearningStrategies
Forest (IF), Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM), First
Component of the PCA (PCA-F) and Last Component
of the PCA (PCA-L). Though PCA-F works better in
terms of Top100 Precision, AUC-PR and AUC-ROC,
overall the accuracy of passive unsupervised learning is
very low.
In Fig. 7, we report the fraud detection accuracy of
the AL techniques discussed in Section 5. A horizontal
line is added in order to make the comparison with
the baseline strategy HRQ easier. The experiments are
performed with k = 100, q = 5 and m = 1000. These
hyper-parameters have been set by trial-and-error and
are compatible with the kind of exploration effort that
our industrial partner could ask to its investigators.
The first remark is that AL (Fig. 7) significantly outper-
forms passive learning unsupervised techniques (Fig. 6).
Second, it appears that exploratory AL alone is not
able to outperform the standard HRQ strategy. In par-
ticular unsupervised explorations are of no use: the
PCA based exploration EAL-P as well as random ex-
ploration EAR are significantly worse than the baseline
HRQ. The highest accuracy is obtained by SSSL (SR)
or by combining SSSL with uncertainty sampling (SR-
U). The SR strategy leads to an improvement in preci-
sion of 5.84%, while SR-U leads to an improvement of
5.15%. Similar improvement are observed for the AUC-
PR (Fig. 7b), while a wider range of techniques per-
12 Fabrizio Carcillo et al.
BL EAL SSSL SSSL+EAL
H
R
Q R P U M SR SU SM SE
SR
−U
SR
−R
SR
−M
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Strategies
To
p1
00
 P
re
ci
si
on
(a)
BL EAL SSSL SSSL+EAL
H
R
Q R P U M SR SU SM SE
SR
−U
SR
−R
SR
−M
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Strategies
A
U
−P
R
C
(b)
BL EAL SSSL SSSL+EAL
H
R
Q R P U M SR SU SM SE
SR
−U
SR
−R
SR
−M
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Strategies
A
U
−R
O
C
(c)
Fig. 7: Transaction-based case study. Box-plots summarize the accuracy measures obtained over 60 days and 20
trials. Black points indicate the mean value for each box and the horizontal line indicates the mean for the baseline
HRQ. The extended names for the strategies listed on the horizontal axes can be found in Table 1. Comparison in
terms of: Top100 Precision (a), Area Under the Precision-Recall Curve (b) and Area Under the Receiver Operator
Characteristic Curve (c). Dark boxes indicate the best strategy and those which are not statistically different
(paired Wilcoxon test).
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Fig. 8: Transaction-based case study. Comparison in terms of: Top100 Precision (a), Area Under the Precision-
Recall Curve (b) and Area Under the Receiver Operator Characteristic Curve (c). Dark boxes indicate the best
strategy and those which are not statistically different (paired Wilcoxon test).
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form better in terms of AUC-ROC curve (Fig. 7c). The
most efficient combination in our setting is therefore ob-
tained by a combination of stochastic semi-supervised
approach with the standard HRQ strategy for active
learning (Fig. 9).
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Fig. 9: Class conditional distributions in the PC1/PC2
space and the transactions selected by the SR strat-
egy, the best one in our experimental comparison. A set
of 100 transactions is selected using the Highest Risk
Querying approach (green dots), and a random set of
1000 transactions is selected and labeled as the genuine
class (SSSL, purple dots).
We have also compared the semi-supervised tech-
nique SR with the standard Random Oversample and
SMOTE oversampling techniques. As shown in Fig. 8,
SR appears to be better in terms of Top100 Precision,
AUC-PR and AUC-ROC. ROS and SMOTE outper-
form HRQ only in terms of AUC-ROC.
In Fig. 10, a comparison between SR and SRN[p] with
different values of p is reported (where p is the percent-
age of genuine transactions retained from the feedback
set). SR is statistically better than the SRN[p] strate-
gies in terms of Precision, AUC-PR and AUC-ROC and
for all p ∈ {75, 50, 25, 0}. Our findings are similar to the
results of Jacobusse and Veenman [20]. They have used
a synthetic dataset with an imbalance ratio of 1% and
they have observed a higher AUC-ROC for the SRN[p]
strategy in case of very small p.
In Fig. 12, we report the impact on precision of the pro-
portion of daily transactions selected by SR. The SR
experiments reported in Fig. 7 refer to a selection of
1000 points (0.50% of the daily transactions) while the
highest precision (statistically significant) is attained
for 2% of the daily transactions. The figure shows then
the existence of a trade-off in precision between a con-
figuration corresponding to HRQ (i.e. no additional se-
lected points, on the left-side) and a configuration with
many added points (right side). Our interpretation is
that both selection bias (left-side configuration) and
excessive imbalance (right-side configuration) may be
detrimental to precision. An accurate tuning of such
trade-off is expected to be beneficial for the final per-
formance.
6.2 Card-based fraud detection
In this second case study, we retain the most promising
techniques form the transaction assessment (namely,
SR and SR-U), and we compare them with the Multiple
Instance Learning strategies described in Section 5.5.1
(v = 0.05) and 5.5.2 ( = 1e − 3). Fig. 11 summarizes
the results for the card detection study, using Top100
Card Precision, AUC-PR and AUC-ROC as accuracy
metrics.
When the Top100 Precision is considered as perfor-
mance metric, stochastic semi-supervised with random
labeling and max combining function (MF-SR) returns
the best result with a detection improved by 3.21%. The
strategy also performs well in terms of AUC-ROC, but
is outperformed (by a small margin) by the logarithmic
combining function when considering AUC-PR as the
performance metric.
Similarly to the results obtained at the transaction
level, the best strategies are those combining the
baseline High Risk Querying with stochastic semi-
supervised with random labeling (SR) or uncertainty la-
beling (SU). The addition of an exploratory part (QFU,
or SR-U strategies) did not allow to improve the detec-
tion accuracy. The performances are even slightly de-
creased in terms of Top100 Precision for SR-U strate-
gies.
The results show that the combining function plays an
important role. While the max and logarithmic per-
formed best overall, the softmax clearly hampered the
fraud detection accuracy.
In Fig. 13 we show the impact on money savings related
to the adoption of the MF-HRQ and MF-SR techniques
respectively. Fig. 13a reports the daily amount of fraud-
ulent money detected by two approaches (as a percent-
age of daily transacted money). Fig. 13b reports the
daily amount of fraudulent money which would have
been saved if the AL technique would have been used in-
stead of the FDS implemented by our industrial partner
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Fig. 10: Transaction-based case study. Comparison of sampling strategies SRN[p] for different p values: percentage
of retained negative samples from the feedback set. Note that SR corresponds to SRN[p] with p=100. Comparison in
terms of: Top100 Precision (a), Area Under the Precision-Recall Curve (b) and Area Under the Receiver Operator
Characteristic Curve (c). Dark boxes indicate the best strategy and those which are not statistically different
(paired Wilcoxon test).
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Fig. 11: Card-based case study. Comparison in terms of: Top100 Precision (a), Area Under the Precision-Recall
Curve (b) and Area Under the Receiver Operator Characteristic Curve (c). Dark boxes indicate the best strategy
and those which are not statistically different (paired Wilcoxon test).
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Fig. 12: Transaction-based case study. Top100 Precision
when varying the number of points selected in SR. The
dark box indicates the best strategy (paired Wilcoxon
test).
(as a percentage of daily fraudulent transacted money).
However, we are not able to measure the amount of
fraudulent transactions detected later than our partner
since from the historical data we cannot reconstruct if
the fraud was indeed detected by the industrial FDS
(or labeled after a claim of the cardholder).
To conclude, stochastic semi-supervised labeling (SR
and SU) combined with HRQ remained the best strate-
gies, confirming the results obtained at the transaction
level. Regarding the combining functions, the logarith-
mic function provided the best performance in terms of
AUC-ROC, but the max function significantly outper-
formed in terms of Top100 Precision. Overall, the max
combining function was observed to provide the most
stable improvement throughout the range of explored
performance metrics.
7 Conclusion and future work
This paper investigates the impact of active learning
strategies on the fraud detection accuracy in credit
cards. Using a real-world dataset of several millions of
transactions over sixty days, we provided an extensive
analysis and comparison of different strategies, involv-
ing standard active learning, exploratory active learn-
ing, semi-supervised learning and combining functions5.
5 We made the StreamingActiveLearningStrategies reposi-
tory available in github.com/fabriziocarcillo/
In particular we assessed the importance of different
selection criteria (supervised, unsupervised or semi-
supervised). Moreover, we provided a two-dimensional
visualization of the complexity (e.g. non separability)
of the fraud detection problem as well as a visualiza-
tion of the distribution of the query points issued by
the different strategies.
Our results show that unsupervised outlier detection
has very low accuracy in the context of credit card fraud
detection. This is especially true for a context where
only a very small number of cards can be investigated
every day and high precision is required.
Furthermore we find that the baseline active learning
for fraud detection, the Highest Risk Querying, can be
noticeably improved by combining it with Stochastic
Semi-supervised Learning, thereby allowing to increase
the fraud detection accuracy by up to five percent. Ex-
ploratory active learning techniques (including super-
vised or unsupervised selection criteria) have not im-
proved the fraud detection task. This can be attributed
to the highly imbalanced nature of the data and the
small exploration budget that can be reasonably allo-
cated in a fraud detection system.
Last, our results on combining functions for bags of
transactions showed that the baseline strategy, imple-
mented with the max strategy, was the most stable
across different accuracy metrics, but that alternative
functions could be worth considering.
Future work will focus on two main directions, the strat-
ification of the dataset according to the properties of
transactions or cardholders, the design and assessment
of hybrid strategies to combine unsupervised (notably
outlier detection) and supervised methods.
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